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Abstract:  This paper agrees that a suitably generalized Darwinism may help understand 
socioeconomic change, but finds the most publicized generalization by Hodgson and Knudsen 
unsuitable.  To do better, it generalizes the extension of Neo-Darwinism into evolutionary 
developmental biology (“evo-devo”), which pays more attention to genomes-as-instructors 
than to genes-as-replicators, and to the entire process of instructed development than to fully 
developed organisms.  The new generalization has clear connections to economics with a 
minimum guarantee of helpfulness: it generalizes both evo-devo and previously elaborated 
approaches that already helped understand specific issues of comparative economics, 
economic reforms, and transformation policies. 
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Introduction 
There is a broad agreement that no version of Darwinian evolutionary biology is directly 
relevant to the evolution of human economies and societies.  But evolutionary economists still 
disagree on whether or not some generalization of some version of Darwinism might 
nevertheless be helpful.  These disagreements perhaps most clearly appear in the recent 
conflict between the generalization of Darwinism elaborated by Hodgson (2002, 2004), 
Knudsen (2004), and Hodgson and Knudsen (2006), and the Continuity Hypothesis advocated 
by Witt (2003, 2004) and Cordes (2006, 2007) – let me refer to the two as HKGD and CH, 
respectively.  While HKGD extracts from biological Darwinism certain notions and principles 
that its authors claim also to apply to socioeconomic evolution, CH considers Darwinism able 
to explain the origins of the human cognitive abilities on which this evolution builds, but 
insists that Darwinism has nothing to do with this evolution itself. 
In a first approximation, the present paper can be situated by its agreements and 
disagreement with these two sides.  It agrees with the authors of HKGD that biological 
evolution and socioeconomic evolution do follow certain common principles that can be 
regarded as Darwinian, but shows that these principles substantially differ from those 
considered by them.  And it agrees with the advocates of CH that socioeconomic evolution is 
a continuation of the biological one, and that it is indeed not Darwinian in the sense of 
HKGD, but shows that it does follow certain principles that can be considered Darwinian, 
provided Darwinism is generalized in a more suitable way than HKGD. 
 But this paper aims to be more constructive than critical.  Instead of engaging in 
extensive evaluations of, agreements with, or objections against, different existing views, its 
main purpose is to show how a new, for socioeconomic applications truly suitable 
generalization of Darwinism (SGD) can be elaborated.  Its fist step is to choose another 
version of biological Darwinism to generalize than HKGD.  Biological Darwinism now exists 
in three versions, which can roughly be described as follows: 
(A) The original Darwinism, limited to the evolution of directly observable features of 
adult organisms (phenotypes). 
(B) Neo-Darwinian synthesis, which takes into account genes, recognizes that many 
features of organisms depend on them, but is mainly concerned with their replicating and 
evolving, while saying little on how they instruct the forming of organisms (ontogeny), and in 
what precise ways their instructions mix with inputs from environments. 
(C) Evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo), which extends attention from 
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genes to entire genomes, shifts its focus from how genomes replicate to how they instruct, in 
collaboration with environments, the forming and development of organisms, and considers 
the entire process of this forming and development, and not only the final outcomes.1 
Version (A) is clearly unsuitable, because it ignores what causes the observable 
features to change and evolve.  Version (B), as can be inferred from its generalization by 
HKGD, is not very suitable either.  For social scientists, its focus on genes-as-replicators is 
misplaced, because replicating is only a special method of retaining valuable information over 
time, used much more over generations of organisms than in economies and societies.  These 
only rarely replicate, but most often arise, evolve, develop and possibly fall as childless 
singles.  To retain their basic information, they typically use other ways.  The only kind of 
genomic replicating that has a meaningful socioeconomic counterpart appears to be the one 
taking place within a multicellular organism, by which the organism’s genomic instructions 
are spread across its cells.  But this kind can only be seen to correspond to what CH calls 
“imitation,” “diffusion,” or “transmission,” taking place among the members of one given 
society. 
The only promising version to generalize is therefore (C).  But, to avoid the pitfalls of 
superficial and often misleading analogies, SGD generalizes only its basic logic, while 
leaving all of its biology-specific aspects carefully aside.  Thus, when using this logic for 
distinguishing between the evolution and the development of economies, SGD recognizes the 
great factual differences between this development and the development of organisms, and 
carefully ignores all the biological particularities of the latter. 
Next step is to put SGD on a solid micro-basis – without which, as has been so many 
times demonstrated, full clarity cannot be attained.  SGD joins HKGD in using the term 
“interactor,” coined by Hull (1980), to denote the organized and functioning entities, the 
visible products of evolutionary processes, of which organisms are special biological cases.2  
                                                 
1 For version (A), the basic reference is of course Darwin (1859).  In spite of its high age, this version still 
appears popular, especially among paleontologists.  Perhaps the most prominent of them, or at least the best 
known to non-specialists, is J.S. Gould.  That he has not fully attained version (B) can be inferred from what he 
presents as difficult to explain evolutionary paradoxes – such as punctuated equilibria, most recently presented in 
Gould (2007) – that turn out to be quite easy to explain when attention is properly shifted from the evolution of 
forms of phenotypes to the evolution of their genes and genomes.  References for version (B) are more difficult 
to choose, as it has been pioneered, elaborated and propagated by many authors.  Let me only mention among 
the pioneers Huxley (1942), who is the author of the term “Neo-Darwinian synthesis,” and among the 
elaborators and propagators, Dawkins (1976, 1982, 1996).  Version (C) is the newest; to non-specialists perhaps 
best presented by Carroll (2005) and Carroll et al. (2008). 
2 The term “vehicle” introduced in this meaning by Dawkins (1976) is less suitable because it does not properly 
express how richly and variably active such entities may be.  The term "system" has two other drawbacks: it is 
too general, currently used in many different meanings, which may cause misunderstandings and confusion; and 
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But it departs from HKGD by specifying for each large interactor considered a set of smaller 
interactors of which it can be seen to consist – such as proteins for a cell, cells for an 
organism, and individuals for a society.  This makes SGD compatible with the methodological 
individualism of modern social sciences, and allows it simply to clarify, in Sections I.6 and 
III.1 below, the old and apparently still controversial issues of multilevel evolution and group 
selection.  That HKGD lacks a clear micro-basis is another reason, in addition to its misplaced 
focus on replicating, why meaningful socioeconomic applications of it are so difficult to find. 
 Concerning such applications, SGD has an inbuilt advantage.  As opposed to HKGD, 
which stems from the highly abstract areas of ontology and philosophy of biology (much of 
which now appears to need updating), SGD has its roots in more mundane approaches to 
issues of comparative economics, economic reforms, and transformation policies (Pelikan 
1988, 1992, 2003a).  It is from efforts to generalize these approaches that SGD started to 
emerge.  SGD is thus a collection of general principles that turned out to be common both to 
the evo-devo version of Darwinism and to already proven ways of dealing with specific 
economic issues, and is therefore guaranteed applicable at least to these issues. 
Emphatically, however, this paper is far from claiming that generalizing Darwinism is 
the only way to understand socioeconomic change.  There are always two alternative 
strategies for addressing new problems within a scientific discipline: (i) to search for their 
solutions within this discipline, or (ii) to learn from another discipline where similar problems 
have already been solved.   Both have merits and demerits.  Strategy (i) makes it easy to 
communicate with colleagues, but may uselessly repeat difficult work that has already been 
done elsewhere.  Strategy (ii) avoids this repetition, but requires learning the basics of another 
discipline.  The choice is free, depending on what one hopes to find within one’s discipline 
and how much interested and willing one is also to look elsewhere.  This paper is addressed 
exclusively to those economists and other social scientists whose choice is strategy (ii). 
To avoid misunderstandings and misdirected criticism, two early disclaimers are in 
order.  First, despite its focus on the instructing role of genomes, SGD is not genetically 
deterministic.  In addition to extending attention from genes to entire genomes, it does not 
claim that genomic instructing alone determines how organisms form, develop and function, 
but fully recognizes that environments may also play important roles.  It only makes it clear, 
following the elementary logic of information processing, that however important these roles 
might be, the instructing remains primary: these roles are both initially defined and ultimately 
                                                                                                                                                        
its classical definition is "a collection of given parts interconnected in given ways," which makes it poorly suited 
for denoting developing entities, where both the parts and the interconnections are variable. 
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limited by it.  Thus, SGD is in a sense deterministic, but not naively and only negatively: it 
recognizes that genomes are far from determining what specific features their organisms will 
actually develop, but points out that they set strict limits to what these features might, in the 
most ideal environments, possibly become.  It thus implies for each genome a certain 
developmental potential, which environmental inputs can more or less actualize, but never 
expand.  Instead of genetically deterministic, SGD may thus be called “genomically limitist” 
– making it clear, for instance, that the genome of a mouse will never allow it to grow into an 
elephant, no matter how much food it might be given, and that the genome of a monkey will 
never allow it to learn higher mathematics, no matter to how many schools it might be sent.  
 Second, despite its building on a clear micro-basis, SGD is not naively reductionist.  It 
does not reduce an interactor to a “simple sum” of smaller interactors – as would do the naive 
reductionist that holists are so fond of criticizing (and who appears to be an easy-to-beat straw 
man of their own imagination).  SGD fully recognizes that what an interactor is and does also 
depends on how its smaller interactors are organized, and allows all kinds of feedback through 
which their organization may in return influence their own features – although only to the 
extent to which they are intrinsically able to let their features be influenced.  SGD only insists 
that no complex interactor can fall as a holistic mystery from the sky, but each must start with 
some small interactors forming its initial organization.  Only then can the organization begin 
to influence, within the limits of their intrinsic malleability, their features, while they may 
respond by helping the organization, some more than others, to develop and evolve. 
Note that this simple clarification suffices to settle the old controversy of whether it is 
individuals who form society or whether it is society that forms individuals: the clarification 
makes it obvious that some prehistoric individuals, based on their genomic potential for 
socializing, must have first formed some initial society, before the interplay of feedback 
influences of societies on individuals and of individuals on societies, under the ever present 
constraint of the individuals’ genomic potential, could start unfolding. 
 The rest of the paper consists of three parts and a concluding comment.  SGD is 
briefly presented in Part I.  Part II derives from it a conceptual model of economic change.  
Part III consists of examples of applications: a simple clarification of the issue of group 
selection, new questions for three fields of economic research that may help bring them 
together, and a few pieces of advice for dealing with issues of reform policies and economic 
development.  The concluding comment briefly considers the possibilities of SGD to help 
other social scientists understand other issues of socioeconomic change. 
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I  Suitably Generalized Darwinism 
I.1  Instructions and their interactors 
In a first approximation, SGD conceptualizes evolution as a kind of trial-and-error 
experimenting, which can be structured, following the early generalization of Darwinism by 
Campbel (1965), into variation, selection, and retention.3 
In a closer view, the variation is seen to consist of the actually attempted, more or less 
randomly (irrelevantly) chosen trials from a set of potentially feasible trials.  The trials consist 
of instructions for the forming, functioning and developing of interactors. 
The interactors are tested for their performance in more or less adverse environments. 
In general, the success criteria of the tests may, but need not, be those of natural selection, and 
the environments may, but need not, include competition and/or cooperation with other 
interactors.  Performance success of interactors imply evolutionary success of their 
instructions.  These remain retained in certain evolutionary memories, from where they can 
continue to instruct the forming, functioning and developing of their interactors.  Possibly, but 
not necessarily, successful instructions may be transmitted to other interactors – inherited by 
offspring, or copied by neighbors. 
 Note that this simple distinction between interactors and instructions suffices to clarify 
the still controversial issue of the units of selection in Darwinian evolution: such units, as the 
evolution’s final longest-lasting products, may only consist of instructions.  It is the rare 
instructions able to guide the forming and the developing of successfully performing 
interactors that are what the evolution produces, selects and retains in some lasting memories.  
In contrast, interactors are only units of testing, which may be, and often are, short-lived.4 
In biology, where the main examples of interactors are proteins, cells, and organisms, 
the relevant instructions are contained in genomes.  The trials with them – such as mutations 
and recombinations – are considered random, as no use of information relevant to their 
eventual success has been found. 
In the social sciences, where interactors may be exemplified by different social and 
                                                 
3 That Campbel wisely keeps his generalization free from the biologically-loaded notions of “inheritance” and 
“replication” is worth emphasis.  This makes it particularly difficult to understand why Hodgson and Knudsen 
insist on building on these notions, and even distort their references to Campbell by giving the impression that he 
also used them.  Hodgson (2004), for instance, offers two such distortions: “variation, inheritance, and selection” 
and “replication, selection, and variety-creation.”  In private correspondence, Professor Hodgson admitted that 
Campbell did not use these notions, but was reluctant to abandon them because of their widespread uses in the 
current philosophy of biology literature. 
4 This agrees with Dawkins (1976, 1982) that units of selection can be neither organisms nor groups or societies, 
but disagrees with his limiting them to single genes.  Some of them may consist of several interrelated genes and 
moreover include non-genic segments of DNA whose RNA transcriptions act as important regulators by 
themselves, without prescribing, as genes are defined to do, the synthesis of any protein (cf., e.g., Mattick, 2004). 
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economic organizations – from small groups to entire economies and societies – the relevant 
instructions are contained, as explained in more detail below, in institutional rules.  The trials 
with their changes need not be entirely random: some information on their eventual effects 
may be acquired from practice and/or theory, and used in making these trials.  But as this 
information is, and for a foreseeable future appears to remain, far from perfect, even these 
trials must at least partly be random, made with the help of some irrelevant inputs.  Many of 
them are therefore also likely to be errors, requiring what may labeled as Darwinian selection 
before a successful variant of institutional rules can be found and retained. 
But this raises the question of labels: should an evolution in which trials employ some 
relevant information, and are thus only partially random, be labeled “Darwinian” or 
“Lamarckian”?  Although the answer is largely a matter of personal taste, there are good 
reasons for keeping the Darwinian one.  Namely, Darwin himself did not exclude the 
possibility of informed mutations, and the only reason why modern biology excludes them 
(by the Weismann barrier) is that they have not been found to exist.  Biological Lamarckism 
has failed simply because of its inability to show in what biochemically feasible ways the 
relevant information could be produced and allowed effectively to direct genomic change.  
But in socioeconomic evolution, as mentioned above and convincingly argued by Nelson and 
Winter (1982), corresponding information channels demonstrably do exist.  To comprehend 
also this evolution, SGD thus cannot reject them – with the somewhat curious, but perfectly 
logical implication that biological evolution is a special, handicapped case of a general 
Darwinian evolution, admirable for doing so marvelously well without them.5 
 
I.2  Environments 
Each interactor faces certain environments: nature and possibly other interactors, which may 
be its competitors and/or collaborators, either independent or fellow agents of a higher-level 
interactor.  The environments contain the resources – materials, energy, and information –
which the interactor needs in order to form, develop and function according to its instructions. 
The conditions for obtaining the needed resources imply the success criteria for testing 
interactors’ performance.  In generous environments the conditions are easy to meet and the 
tests are easy to pass: a wide variety of interactors can succeed and thus allow a wide variety 
of instructions to be selected and retained.  But in hard environments, where the needed 
resources are difficult to obtain, the variety of successful interactors is narrow.  Successful 
                                                 
5 The radical rejection of Lamarckism by Hodgson and Knudsen (2006), which must be understood to exclude 
such channels, is thus a third reason why socioeconomic applications of HKGD are so difficult to find. 
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instructions – among all the feasible instructions that the more or less random evolutionary 
experimenting can try – are there rare (if they exist at all), and may require long 
experimenting before any of them is found. 
All this brings to light the important point that in general, Darwinian evolution is only 
satisficing – and not, as it is sometimes wrongly claimed, optimizing.  It does not seek 
maximum efficiency, only eliminates what the environmental success criteria evaluate as 
excessive inefficiencies.  In hard environments, where even small inefficiencies are excessive, 
satisficing of course does converge to optimizing.  But if the environments are more generous, 
instructions may prescribe and their interactors exhibit many useless and wasteful ornaments, 
and yet both be approved of as successful. 
 Why an interactor needs materials and energy significantly differs from why it needs 
information: the former, to have a range of possibilities to act, and the latter, to know which 
of these possibilities to choose.  This implies two success conditions: (A) the materials and 
energy that it possesses and/or is able to obtain must allow at least one of the possibilities to 
lead to success; (B) the information that it possess and/or is able to obtain must allow at least 
one of the successful possibilities to be found.  Condition (A) is harder: if it is not met, no 
success is possible.  But if (B) is not met, success is only unlikely: the interactor may still go 
ahead and try its chance with the help of some random or otherwise irrelevant inputs.  Of 
course, the more of the relevant information is missing, the less likely it is to succeed. 
But there is a more fundamental precondition: to obtain from environments and 
effectively use any resources, each interactor must already be equipped with a minimum of 
corresponding resources, including tools, energy, and information.  Its effective uses of 
resources are thus doubly constrained: by their availability in its environments, and by its 
equipment for finding them, obtaining them, and using them. 
Sufficiently sophisticated interactors may have the ability, due to sophisticated 
instruction in their information equipment, to use parts of the obtained resources for 
developing their equipments, and thus allowing more of the available resources to be obtained 
and used in the future.  Importantly, however, this process can never start from zero.  At any 
moment, the actual equipment constrains all uses of resource, including those for its own 
development.  Hence, as  can be deduced by simple recursive reasoning, no interactor can 
start as an empty box – a blank slate, or tabula rasa – that environments might equip at their 
will.  Each must begin with some intrinsically own initial equipment, which determines how 
the obtaining and using of resources from environments may start, and sets ultimate limits to 
how far, in the most generous environments, its may potentially continue. 
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In biology, as noted, the key initial equipment of an organism resides in its genome, 
which determines how the organism can start using environmental inputs for its development, 
and sets limits to what extent, in the most favorable environments, it could potentially 
develop.6 
What is the initial equipment of an economy, and how it limits the economy’s 
development potential, will considered in more detail in Section II.  Now it suffices to note 
that concerning problems with equipments in materials and energy, they are easy to interpret 
in terms of standard theories of capital and investment.  And many problems with information 
equipments are easy to understand by all the users of personal computers, who know that 
every information processing needs pre-existing information equipment in the form of 
suitable hardware and software.7  But one information problem is less easy: how can any 
information equipment form and develop by itself, without some pre-existing information 
equipment of an intelligent designer?  It is this problem that only some form of Darwinism 
appears able to solve.  To get a handle on it, it is necessary to adopt a very broad perspective 
on information and carefully clarify all the terms used. 
 
I.3  Information, data, and instructions 
Information problems are of prime importance for social scientists simply because different 
humans and their different societies differ much less in the materials of which they are made 
and in the energy they need for living than in the ways in which the materials and the uses of 
energy are shaped.  All existing individuals and all existing societies can thus be seen as 
outcomes of choices from wide ranges of alternatives that the materials and energy available 
make equally feasible.  What determines which specific individuals and which specific 
societies will form and how they will develop – and indeed that they will be human 
individuals and human societies, and not individuals and societies of other species – is 
therefore above all the information used for guiding these choices. 
 To comprehend information problems in their entirety, the notion of “information” 
must first be given a sufficiently broad meaning to include both the information that 
                                                 
6 In addition to its genome, as is sometimes emphasized, an organism also needs equipment for reading the 
genomic instructions and putting them to proper uses.  But, considering the information needed for guiding the 
development of a specific organism, this equipment is secondary, virtually the same for all organisms of all 
species.  Its relation to the genome may be compared to the one of proper light and good glasses to the contents 
of rare texts.   
7 The use of personal computers by social scientists is perhaps the main reason why most of them now drop what 
was not so long ago a widespread belief: that a human individual is a blank slate on which anything can be 
written by society.  Computers made it most tangibly clear that no information can be poured into empty boxes.  
Without referring to computers, convincing arguments for dropping the blank slate belief are in Pinker (2001). 
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interactors may receive and process and the one with which they need to be equipped.  It 
appears best to follow the main lines of the quantitative theories of information that define it 
in relation to choice situations (e.g., Marschak 1954, Ashby 1956, Theil 1967).8  Here, 
however, it will not be necessary to quantify information exactly: this would require a number 
of simplifying and therefore doubtful assumptions, and might mislead attention from primary 
problems to secondary mathematical subtleties.  The following rough definition will suffice: 
Information for an interactor is what helps it to choose an alternative from a set of two 
or more feasible alternatives one that meets its internal success criterion – e.g. maximizing its 
objective function or satisficing its norm.  The information can be carried by an event chosen by 
nature or other interactors from a set of two or more possible events. 
Given the interactor’s choice set and success criterion, the more choice alternatives 
there are and the fewer of them would be successful, the more information the interactor 
needs to find one of these.  If some of this information is missing and the choice must 
nevertheless be made, the information deficit must be covered from irrelevant, possibly 
random events.  The higher the deficit, the more likely the chosen alternative will fail.  
Thus, importantly, what is information depends on the interactor considered, and not 
on the environments.  Objectively, these only produce physical events, such as 
electromagnetic waves or air vibrations, which can contain information only to the extent to 
which the interactor is equipped, in addition to the material means needed for perceiving 
them, with information on how to use them.  Otherwise physical states and events are nothing 
more than physical states and events. 
 To distinguish the information processed from the information equipment for 
processing it, it is suitable to call the former “data” and the latter “instructions.”  But these are 
only roles, not permanent properties: data in one choice problem may become instructions in 
another choice problem, or vice versa.  Automatic computer programming and the 
programming of learning offer clear examples: in both cases, instructions are used for 
elaborating other instructions, and these thus play, while being elaborated, the roles of data. 
 The term “instruction” is closely related to the one of “program.”  SGD agrees with 
the increasingly accepted view that human behavior is program-based (cf., e.g., Holland 1995, 
Cosmides and Tooby 1997, Vanberg 2004), and thus admits that the information equipment of 
an interactor may also be said to consist of programs.  Like in computer programming, 
                                                 
8 Note that even the purely technical information theory by Shannon and Weaver (1949) can be seen to imply a 
choice situation: the receiver can be viewed as having to choose from a given set of symbols (an alphabet, a 
vocabulary), with the help of the signals received, those that were actually sent by the emitter. 
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instructions are seen to be elements of programs, and programs are seen to be specifically 
organized chains or networks of instructions. 
 There are two reasons why SGD focuses on instructions rather than programs.  One is 
diplomatic: as interactors are meant also to include humans, describing these as instructed 
sounds better than describing them as programmed.  The second reason is factual: such a 
detailed focus is necessary clearly to see that one program may combine instructions of 
different origins. 
But, to include humans, both terms must be interpreted more broadly than in ordinary 
computer programming (although advanced computer programming can also embrace these 
broad interpretations).  In particular, programs must be seen also to govern purposeful 
behaviors, learning, searching, discovering, innovating, and creating.  Instructions must 
therefore include norms and/or objectives, feedback loops, and prescriptions for generating 
random or otherwise arbitrary trials and for identifying and eliminating the committed errors. 
As opposed to usual computer programming, where one instruction determines just 
one operation, instructions must be admitted, as in ordinary languages, to be possibly less 
sharp, determining only a more or less large subset of feasible actions.  A simple, but for 
social scientists important example is the choice of a move in a game: the rules of the game 
are more or less broad instructions telling the players which moves are permissible, and the 
players must then use their own internal instructions to specify which of the permissible 
moves they choose. 
 The choice of a specific action may thus be understood as a result of cooperation of 
several instructions.  They may be viewed as gradually narrowing constraints, eliminating 
larger and larger parts of a given choice set, until only one choice alternative is left.  
Considering the total quantity of information needed to specify this alternative, each of these 
instruction can be seen to supply some of it, and all of them all of it.  This includes even the 
cases when not all of the relevant information is available.  Then, as noted, to obtain the total 
needed to proceed with the choice, some of the instructions must prescribe uses of random or 
otherwise irrelevant steps.9 
 All this makes it clear that the above-mentioned initial equipment, which each 
                                                 
9 That interactors are defined able to take probabilistic or random steps means that they can do more than Turing 
machines, defined to proceed according to deterministic algorithms only.  This means, among other things, that 
they need not stop undecided in face of two or more equally advantageous choices – as did the proverbial 
Buridan’s ass that starved to death at an equal distance from two equally attractive heaps of hay.  To cope with 
such choices, an interactor only needs to be equipped with instructions for a random step – such as throwing a 
coin – to survive.  This example also illustrates that using randomness need not always diminish the probability 
of success – it may sometimes be the only way to it.  
11
 #0817 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
interactor needs to start receiving and using inputs from environments, must contain specific 
initial instructions telling it how to do so.  The sophisticated interactor which is able to use 
some of these inputs for improving itself – in other words, to learn, and possibly even learn to 
learn – must contain specific initial instructions also for developing these abilities.  The 
general principle behind all this is that each information processing – be it a relatively simple 
use of data for immediate decisions or complex learning of new instructions for future uses – 
requires some pre-existing instructions. 
This adds clarity to why no intelligent being can be born as a tabula rasa, and helps 
settle the longstanding “nature vs. nurture” debates on whether it its genomes or experiences 
and education that determine the actual cognitive abilities (”intelligence,” ”bounds of 
rationality”) of an adult brain.  It is now widely recognized that both matter, but how exactly 
they cooperate is still an open question.  The need of instructions for elaborating instructions 
logically implies that genomic instructions must initially determine a certain development 
potential that experiences and education may more or less actualize, but never overstep.  An 
individual’s cognitive abilities are therefore no arithmetic sum of “talents plus experiences 
and education,” where more of the latter could replace less of the former.  Quite to the 
contrary, more of the latter, to be properly understood and used, requires more of the 
former.10    
rming, functioning and developing of 
en to consist and through whose actions and interactions the instructions can be seen 
to work
                                                
 
I.4  Instructions for functioning vs. instructions for associating 
Instructions are in the center of SGD: they are both the key results of the evolutionary trial-
and-error experimenting, and the key guides for the fo
successful interactors.  But how do they exactly do it? 
 It is for this question that a clear micro-basis is most needed.  To understand how an 
interactor under the guidance of some key instructions can form, function and develop, it is 
necessary to specify a set of elementary interactors – let me call them “agents” – of which it 
can be se
. 
An interactor’s behaviors are thus understood as aggregates of its agents’ behaviors.  
The aggregating depends on the organization into which the agents arrange themselves – or, 
in other words, self-organize – and is thus, as emphasized in the introduction, far from any 
“simple sums.”  The interactor may acquire new observable properties, often called 
 
10 The present view largely agrees with Ridley (2003), with the exception of the title: instead of ”Nature via 
Nurture,” it is more logically describes as ”Nurture via Nature.” 
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“emergent,” that differ from all observable properties of its agents.  Yet none of the emergent 
properties falls from the sky: all can be traced to some properties of the agents, provided that 
all the 
uter results from the functioning of its elementary logical switches and 
their w
h, and which 
ones th
to suitably instructed self-
organiz
                                                
relevant properties of theirs are properly taken into account. 
For an interactor that already exists, with its agents already arranged into a certain 
organization, it is relatively easy to imagine how the individual functioning behaviors of its 
agents aggregate, according to their organization, into the global functioning behaviors of 
itself.  This must be sufficiently clear to anyone with a minimum understanding of how the 
functioning of a comp
iring diagram. 
The challenging question is, as noted, how can such an organized and functioning 
interactor form by itself, from initially disconnected agents?  Or, seen from below, how can 
such agents self-organize to form it?  The first necessary condition is that they must be active 
in two dimensions: in addition to their functioning in a given organization, they must also be 
able to associate and dissociate, and thus form and reform organizations.  It is their associative 
behaviors that determine which connections with each other they will establis
ey will refuse, and, in consequence, which organization they will form.11 
Note the contrast with computers: they consist of electronic components that are active 
only functionally but not associatively, and must therefore be wired or printed together 
exogenously.  Note also the most fundamental difference between brains and computers that 
this implies: while there does not appear to be any function of an already formed and 
developed brain that could not at least roughly be simulated by a computer, what computers 
cannot do (so far?) is to form and develop by themselves, thanks 
ing of some initially disconnected elementary components. 
Two-dimensional behaviors require corresponding two-dimensional instructions.  To 
self-organize into a larger functioning interactor, the initially disconnected smaller interactors 
need instructions both on how to associate with each other – and thus form, and find their 
positions in, the interactor’s organization – and on how to function as the interactor’s agents 
 
11 To illustrate why it is important to take associative behaviors properly into account, recall the well-known 
argument that self-organization can somewhat miraculously create order out of disorder, and thus violate the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984).  The miracle rapidly dissolves when it is 
realized that this law is about interactions of chemically inert gas molecules, which are non-associating agents, 
often exemplified by billiard balls bouncing from each other.  In contrast, the basic agents of both organisms and 
societies are associatively highly active and selective, to begin with the different valences of atoms and 
molecules.  Such agents only need favorable environmental conditions – such as the right temperature and 
pressure – to put their associative behaviors to work and self-organize into highly ordered entities.  While 
favorable environmental conditions are necessary, they are only auxiliary – it is not on them, but on the selective 
associative behaviors of the agents that the resulting order most fundamentally depends. 
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in these positions.  The two dimensions may overlap, as some instructions for functioning 
may also affect the agents’ associating, and vice versa.  But distinguishing them is necessary 
for a good understanding of the long chains of effects from the instructing of individual agents 
to the main properties of the by them formed and developed larger interactors.  To understand 
such chains is the main task of genomic biology, and, as will be argued below, should be the 
main ta
his will 
again c
rs may overlook the underlying 
ultimat
ver uses of available environmental inputs, 
to mak
sk of institutional economics. 
Note well that the initially disconnected agents must first of all to use some of their 
instructions for associating, and thus self-organize into some initial, possibly only rudimental 
organization, before they can start using their instructions for functioning as agents of 
organizations.  Only afterword can instructions of the two dimensions take turns in 
influencing the course of events.  Outcomes of the agents’ functioning may change conditions 
for their further self-organizing – which may include changes of their behaviors by learning, if 
their instructions also tell them how to learn.  This will lead them to develop or otherwise 
change the organization, which will modify the conditions for their functioning, and t
hange the conditions for their self-organizing, and so on, possibly many times. 
 What further complicates these processes is that instructions of both dimensions may 
be open to inputs from environments.  This enormously amplifies the potential impact of these 
inputs: in addition to causing the functioning of a given organization to produce certain 
outputs, they may more fundamentally influence the form and the development of the 
organization, and thereby its functioning with the ways of producing outputs.  Their 
influences may be so overwhelming that superficial observe
e responsibility for all that of the initial instructions.   
To see this responsibility, consider an interactor that fails.  This may be due to two 
immediate causes: (a) it has been organized so poorly that no functioning of its agents, 
however excellent, might save it; and/or (b) its agents function so poorly that no way of 
organizing them, however ingenious, might help.  It is then easy to discover that the deep 
cause in both cases is that its instructions have failed to guide its agents – in case (a) to self-
organize, with clever uses of available environmental inputs, into a potentially successful 
organization; and in case (b) to function, with cle
e such an organization actually to succeed. 
Of course, the environments might be so adverse and supply so little of needed inputs 
that no instructing of the agents could help.  But then also no larger interactor from these 
agents in these environments could form and develop, and no evolution of such interactors 
could take place.  This includes the possibility that the adversity is caused by some 
14
 #0817 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
insufficiently cooperative or hostile other interactors, which leads the search for the ultimate 
responsibility to their instructions – with the conclusion that they have been better instructed 
how to
self-
 both to form specific molecules 
posed 
arket liberalization reform by which the functioning of the economy is decentralized. 
by smaller interactors.  But 
                                                
 find and obtain needed resources than the interactor that failed. 
What makes the ultimate responsibility of instructions difficult to see is that many of 
their effects on the performance of interactors take long and for external observers difficult to 
follow ways.  Instructions for associating have often little to do with those for functioning – 
so that observing how agents self-organize may not say much on how they will function, and 
thus make the organization function, once this is formed.  It is as if the agents kept their 
instructions for functioning hidden in sealed envelopes that they will not open until their 
organizing has sufficiently advanced and put them into their first functioning positions.12 
 Note that this difficulty arises already in chemistry.  It is relatively easy to infer how 
atoms will self-organize into different molecules, given their instructions for associating 
displayed by their valences.  The difficulty is in predicting how they will function and interact 
within those molecules, and how the molecules will consequently behave as wholes.  Yet this 
is only a difficulty for the observing chemists.  Whether it is clear to them or not, atoms are in 
specific ways instructed for both associating and functioning, and, depending on 
environmental conditions, their instructing will guide them
and to make the molecules formed behave in specific ways. 
 How weakly instructions for associating may be linked to those for functioning may 
also be seen in the possibly great differences in the extent of centralization that the two may 
prescribe.  For instance, a highly decentralized self-organizing may result in a highly 
centralized control of functioning – such as the largely decentralized ontogeny that results in 
an organism with a central nervous system – and vice versa – such as the centrally im
m
 
I.5  One-level evolution and development 
Both the evolution of instructions and the development of interactors may possibly take place 
at several levels: some interactors may act as instructed agents forming and developing a 
larger interactor while being themselves formed and developed 
first, consider just one level.  This can be represented as follows: 
 Assume a set of agents, internally instructed for certain associative and functional 
 
12 Note that instructions for associating are hidden more deeply than the hidden order disclosed by Holland 
(1995).  This only consists of instructions for functioning, comparable to programs for already made computers.  
In this comparison, the hidden instructions for associating can be seen to guide the very making of a 
programmable computer by self-organizing of its initially disconnected elementary components.  
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behaviors, and certain environments implying certain success criteria.  The task of evolution 
is to find additional instructions that could guide the agents to form, develop a make function 
 large
in a variety of alternative 
ways, o
by evo
ugh the one 
accorde
ere must be some evolutionary memories in which successful 
instruc
a r interactor, able to succeed in these environments. 
 But evolution is sometimes impossible and sometimes unnecessary.  Three cases must 
be distinguished: (a) the environments are so harsh and/or the agents so little able that no 
ways of instructing them can help; (b) the environments are so tolerant and the agents’ 
internal instructions are so complete that they self-organize into a successful larger interactor 
automatically by themselves; (c) the agents are able to self-organize 
f which only few will produce a successful larger interactor. 
It is only in (c) that evolution is both needed and possible.  In (a), no larger successful 
interactors can form at all, and in (b), all of them are automatically successful without any 
evolution.  But (b) can be seen an extreme case of (c).  In general, the instructions guiding the 
agents come there from two sources – inherent, and supplied by evolution.  There may 
therefore be many variants of (c) which differ in the proportion of the two.  Case (b) can then 
be regarded as the extreme (c) in which all the instructions are inherent and none is supplied 
lution.  NB: the opposite is not possible, as some instructions must always be inherent.  
Conceptually, the existence of such a proportion is clear.  But empirically, it is 
difficult to measure it, so that opinions may differ on what it is.  Thus, concerning the 
evolution of life, traditional Darwinians belittle, if not entirely neglect, the inherent 
instructions and believe that only those supplied by evolution are significant.  In contrast, 
many studies of biological self-organization, such as Camazine et al. (2001), do the very 
opposite – and thus may be seen to believe in case (b).  An interesting compromise is in 
Kauffman (1993), where both sources are accorded a positive weight – altho
d to evolution may appear too small even to the most tolerant Darwinians. 
Considering (c) as the only case in which a Darwinian evolution may work, there are 
three more conditions that must be met to allow this evolution actually to work and eventually 
to succeed.  First, there must be a feasible variety of sets of tentative instructions with which 
trials can be made and which contains, possibly as a very small sub-variety, some successful 
ones.  Second, the agents’ internal instructing must enable them to receive and actually follow 
such instructions.  Third, th
tions can be retained. 
If all these conditions met, one-level evolution and development can be understood to 
unfold as follows:  (1) Without full information about the consequences, the evolution 
tentatively picks a combination of instructions and supplies it to the agents.  (2) With the help 
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of their internal instructions, the agents receive this combination, join it to their internal 
instructions, and, guided by both, try to form, make function, and develop a larger interactor.  
(3a) If no functioning interactor forms, the evolution returns to step (1).  (3b) If such an 
interactor forms and develops, its functioning is tested by the environments.  (4a) If it fails, 
the evolution returns to step (1).  (4b) If it succeeds, the instructions picked by the evolution 
are reta
imited.  This evolution must 
erefore proceed mainly by series of successive experiments.  
ls, (I) and (II).  More levels will then be possible to clarify by 
mple 
ty.”  Let me refer to the three levels of 
interac
ed as 
individ
hich suitable 
names 
ined in some of the memories. 
If out of all possible combinations of instructions, only very few are successful, it may 
take a long time, with many repetitions of these steps, before the evolution happens to pick 
one of them.  The time is possible to shorten if many parallel experiments can be conducted 
simultaneously.  But extensive uses of this possibility appear limited to the biochemical 
experimenting in the evolution of life.  In socioeconomic evolution, considered in more detail 
below, the number of parallel experiments is much more l
th
 
I.6  Multilevel evolution and development 
To show how evolution and development can work at more than one level, it suffices to 
clarify two neighboring leve
si recursive reasoning.  
 At level (I), assume again a set of agents, internally instructed for certain associative 
and functional behaviors, and environments implying certain success criteria.  Consider again 
case (c), in which the agents, to be able to form and develop successful larger interactors, 
need to complement their internal instructions with additional instructions supplied by 
evolution.  But now the environments are more adverse: the larger interactors can succeed 
only if they are able further to self-organize at level (II) into an even larger successful 
interactor – possibly called “group” or “socie
tors as “small,” “mid-sized” and “large.” 
This makes the task of the evolution more difficult.  Its instructions must now enable 
the small interactors to form and develop mid-sized interactors that will not only succe
uals, but will moreover be able to form and develop large successful interactors. 
The key to understanding multilevel evolution is to realize that that level (I) evolution, 
to attain such a double success, can employ two alternative strategies, for w
are “complete instructing” and “instructing for a higher-level evolution.” 
Complete instructing means that the evolution must endow the small interactors with 
all the instructions that they need to form and develop mid-sized interactors so precisely that 
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these from the beginning contain all the instructions needed for the forming and developing of 
a large successful interactor.  This strategy turns level (II) into case (b): the mid-sized 
interactors can self-organize into a successful large interactors by themselves, so that no level 
(II) evolution need, nor can, take place.  This strategy may also be described as “one level of 
evoluti
ow or even require 
environ
l (II) and may also be described as “two levels 
of evol
ng and 
eveloping of a sophisticated brain, without which no such evolution could take place. 
 
on with two levels of development.” 
Note that this is the strategy of virtually all biological evolution, where it is extended 
to “one level of evolution with many levels of development.”  The evolution produces 
genomes which may completely instruct the forming and developing of a high hierarchy of 
completely instructed interactors – from proteins and cells to organisms and virtually all of 
societies of organisms.  For instance, even the forming of an ant society is completely 
instructed by the ants’ genomes.  Not to be confused by the possible adaptability and 
flexibility of such societies, it is important to keep in mind that complete instructing need not 
be, and usually is not, closed deterministic programming: it may all
ments more or less to contribute to the development at all levels. 
Instructing for a higher-level evolution means that the mid-sized interactors do not 
receive from the small ones all the instructions they need to form and develop a large 
successful interactor.  Instead, they receive instructions for seeking the missing instructions 
themselves, by own trial-and-error experimenting – in other words, by conducting level (II) 
evolution.  This strategy repeats case (c) at leve
ution with two levels of development.” 
Note that not to endow the mid-sized interactors with all the need instructions for the 
forming and developing of a successful large interactor, and make them instead search for the 
missing instructions themselves, does not diminish the amount of instructions they need.  On 
the contrary, this amount is larger.  This apparent paradox is immediately clear to all the 
computer programmers who know that programming a computer for performing a certain task 
needs a shorter program than programming it for finding out how to perform this task by 
itself.  Compare also the complete genomic instructing of ants with the human genomic 
instructing for a higher-level evolution, which must include instructions for the formi
d
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II  From general Darwinism to a conceptual model of economic change 
II.1  Interactors and instructions in economics  
Like in all social sciences, the smallest interactors in economics are human individuals, but 
attention is narrowed to their behaviors as economic agents – meaning, as usual, their ways of 
using scarce resources.  But it must be kept in mind that this includes the forming, running 
and developing of economic organizations, and making these organizations evolve. 
Economic organizations of different sizes and tightness – from small and tightly 
organized households, workshops, and bureaus to large and more loosely organized national 
economies and supranational economic unions – are the larger interactors.  For most of 
present purposes, it will suffice to consider two of their levels: (I) firms and government 
agencies, and (II) national economies. 
That a market economy is regarded as an organization may need to be explained, as 
organizations are often defined as entities pursuing objectives, while markets are often viewed 
as orders which do not do so.  The point is that markets do not indeed pursue the objectives of 
any of their participants, but they are automatic regulation devices with feedback loops that 
make them aim at certain states, and may thus be regarded “as if” they had objectives of their 
own.  That these objectives may differ from those of their participants is precisely what raises 
problems for policy – for instance, a market economy may stubbornly aim at maintaining a 
lower growth and a higher unemployment than what all of its agents would wish it to do. 
The instructions of an economic organization are its “institutional rules,” possible to 
visualize as the rules of a game.13  Each institutional rule constrains and thus shapes, but 
typically does not fully determine, the behaviors of the organization’s members, and through 
these behaviors influences the organization’s form, development and performance.  
According to their origins, institutional rules fall into formal, designed and imposed by certain 
top agent(s) – such as legislators in economies, or owners of firms – and informal, spread 
from anonymous innovators by spontaneous imitations – such as perhaps first clearly 
described by Hayek (1967).  The effective institutional rules of most of economic 
organizations are mixtures of both.  
While each organization has its own institutional rules, the same rules may be used in 
different organizations – for instance, different firms may use the same rules of corporate 
                                                 
13 The term ”institutional rules” thus has the same meaning as what North (1990) defined as ”institutions.”  I 
used the former term in Pelikan (1988, 1992), but in my subsequent papers I followed North.  Why I now return 
to my previous terminology is that North’s definition has not been widely accepted: even leading economists still 
speak of banks and government agencies as ”institutions,” and not “organizations.”  The word “institution” may 
thus leave readers uncertain about its precise meaning, and cause confusion. 
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governance, or different national economies may use the same property rights.  The rules of a 
higher level constrain the variety of permissible rules of the subordinate levels – for instance, 
the corporate law of a national economy constrains the variety of permissible rules of 
corporate governance within its firms. 
The behaviors of individuals of constrained by the rules of all organizations of which 
they are members – for instance, the behaviors of a firm’s owners and employees are 
constrained both by the in internal rules of the firm and by the overall rules of the entire 
economy.  Under these constraints, their actual behaviors are determined in detail by their 
internal idiosyncratic instructions.  They may respect an institutional rule voluntarily, if it 
coincides with some of their internal rules – such as a law that coincides with some of their 
moral norms – and/or because its violations are sanctioned. 
Important constraints also work in the opposite direction.  The internal instructions of 
individuals imply in part their motivations (utility, values) and in part their cognitive abilities, 
including abilities to learn (more or less bounded rationality, talents).  Both impose 
constraints on what institutional rules they may be able to understand and willing to respect.  
While the constraint of will may be softened by increased incentives and/or sanctions, the 
constraint of understanding is harder.  This appears to be why individuals of exceptionally 
bounded rationality may have difficulties with respecting even simple rules, while some 
highly intricate rules could not be properly understood by anyone. 
Like interactors in general, economic organizations also form, function, develop and 
evolve – although most economists, with the exception of economic historians, usually 
assume that national economies are already formed, and consider initial forming only for 
smaller organizations within them. 
The main point of applying SGD to economics is to put institutional rules in the 
center, and use them to split the processes of economic change into development and 
evolution.  The development of an organization consists of entry and exit of its agents and 
changes in their positions, relationships and behaviors – which leads in an economy to the 
forming and developing of markets, firms, and government agencies – all of this under the 
constraints of its actual institutional rules.  The evolution consists of changes of these rules. 
In principle, this split is simple, but in detail, it may cause difficulties that need to be 
clarified.  First, it is only relative to the organization considered.  An typical example is the 
evolution of rules of firms that is part of the development of the economy under its constant 
rules – such as the evolution of corporate governance of specific firms taking place under the 
constraints of a constant corporate law of the economy. 
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Second, the distinction is more difficult to see in economics than in biology.  There, 
evolution and development proceed at very different speeds, which makes it easy to 
distinguish one from the other: an organism can usually fully develop with a virtually constant 
genome, while the evolution of genomes is much slower, spanning over many generations of 
fully developed organisms.  In contrast, the development of an economic organization and the 
evolution of its institutional rules often proceed at more comparable speeds, and may even be 
closely interwoven. 
  The closeness of the two speeds also increases the difficulties of judging the effects of 
different institutional rules on their organization.  Some institutional rules may not have 
enough time to demonstrate their full development potential, as they may be changed before 
the development under their guidance comes anywhere close to maturity.  And newly evolved 
institutional rules may not be given the opportunity to start with a new organization, but must 
do with the already formed and more or less developed organization left to them by their 
predecessors.  This may prolong the time they need to show what they can achieve, as much 
of the previous development may has to be undone before the development under their 
guidance may start taking off. 
But none of these difficulties refutes the logic of the distinction.  They only require 
careful attention to fine points in order to get the distinction right in concrete situations. 
 
II.2  The development of an economic organization 
An organization forms and develops by self-organizing of its members, which is based on 
their associative behaviors, instructed by its institutional rules.  Some individuals may, and 
usually do, play more important roles than others – such as industrial entrepreneurs creating 
firms, or politicians organizing government agencies.  But the roles of others are never 
entirely negligible: virtually all members more or less importantly contribute, positively or 
negatively, to how the self-organizing will unfold and the organization thus develop. 
 To avoid all superficial analogies with the development of organisms, it is important to 
realize the differences, which mainly stem from differences between their respective basic 
agents – molecules in organisms and human individuals in economic organization.  Most 
important are two: the former are internally instructed for more complex behaviors, and are 
more heterogeneous (less standardized), than the latter. 
The higher complexity of human behaviors limits the possibilities of institutional rules 
to help: they cannot guide individuals as precisely as genomic instructions can guide 
molecules.  Just like the rules of a game, they may only set more or less broad limits and leave 
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individuals free to choose their behaviors within these limits.  But then, the individuals are 
also less informed on how to behave, and must therefore use more of trial-and-error 
experimenting to find this out, than the molecules. 
Moreover, as this complexity includes abilities to learn and adapt, the development of 
human organizations is complicated by additional feedback loops – such as the often 
discussed path-dependence – that change individual behaviors in function of the development, 
and this then changes its speed and/or direction in function of the behavioral changes.  
The heterogeneity implies that the development of an economic organization must 
solve more problems than the development of an organism.  There, thanks to the highly 
standardized molecules, it is relatively easy for genomic instructions to make it sure – 
possibly with some minor trial-and-error experimenting – that molecules of guaranteed 
qualities will play the right roles within cells, and cells of guaranteed qualities will occupy the 
right positions within the organism.  In contrast, the individuals who are to form and develop 
the organization may be of very different and in advance unknown talents, which raises the 
problems of recognizing their talents, designing their positions, selecting the right individuals 
for the right positions, and keeping the positions and the individuals adjusted to each other 
over time.  All these problems must be solved, under the guidance of the organization’s 
institutional rules, by the individuals’ self-organizing, which must therefore involve much 
more of trial-and-error experimenting than the development of an organism. 
Examples of the developmental errors are the tried designs and the tried assignments 
of positions within the organization that turn out to cause serious inefficiencies undermining 
the organization’s success – such as a too difficult job assigned to an insufficiently talented 
individual.  The such errors may and do happen makes the success of the development 
strongly depend on the organization’s internal selection – how precise, severe, and fast this 
selection is in detecting them and eliminating them – which in turn depends on the 
organization’s institutional rules. 
But note well what is often overlooked: such an internal development selection, 
shaped by the organization’s institutional rules differs from the external evolutionary selection 
imposed by environments – such as nature, competing organization, or a higher-level 
organization of which the organization may be a member – on which more below.  
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II.3  The evolution of economic organizations 
An economic organization evolves, as noted, by changing its institutional rules – and thus 
changing its ways of functioning and developing, including its development potential.  To see 
why the right actors for this central evolutionary role are institutional rules, consider the two 
main alternative views of socioeconomic change in which this role is given to other notions: 
to routines by Nelson and Winter (1982), and to memes by Dawkins (1976, 1982).  
Institutional rules turn out to occupy an advantageous middle ground between the two.  They 
form a subset of memes, as only some memes, in addition to replicating from mind to mind, 
also instruct the minds on how to form, develop and make function organizations.  Routines 
form a subset of theirs, as only some institutional rules may be so constraining that they prescribe 
individual behaviors step by step. 
Why the middle ground is best can be explained as follows.  The notion of memes is too 
broad, possibly corresponding to the entire genome of a multicellular organism, including the 
non-instructing “junk,” but not to genes, which, in addition to replicating, instruct the protein 
synthesis, and thus crucially contribute to the organism’s forming, functioning and 
developing.14  The notion of routines is too narrow, as routines do not really correspond to 
what the members of an organization have in common: many parts of many routines are 
specific to individuals, hidden in their idiosyncratic tacit knowledge.  Moreover, both have the 
disadvantage of being less tangible than institutional rules.  Memes are more difficult to 
identify because of the enormous variety and heterogeneity of the ideas that may spread from 
mind to mind.  Routines are more difficult to identify because so many parts of them are tacit.  
In contrast, many institutional rules are clearly written laws, regulations, or charters.  As 
demonstrated by ethnologists and organizational theorists, even the unwritten rules, such as 
informal social and cultural norms, can often be clearly identified and mapped. 
 The evolution of institutional rules, like the biological evolution of genomes, is also a 
kind of trial-and-error experimenting, structured according to Campbell (1965) into variety, 
selection, and retention (NB: here definitely not “replication”!).  But it differs from biological 
evolution in several important respects.  One is that the variety originates in two types of 
sources – formal and informal – corresponding to the two types of institutional rules.  Another 
difference is that the tentative picking of the institutional rules to be tried – as, for instance, in 
the design of an economic reform – need not be, as noted, entirely random.  Although far 
from perfectly informed, it may be helped by relevant learning, or hindered by false religious 
                                                 
14 It is surprising that this obvious fundamental difference between genes and memes has escaped both Dawkins 
and all the social scientists who have tried to develop a meme-based theory of societal evolution. 
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or ideological beliefs. 
Another important difference is that the performance tests of economic organizations, 
which determine the fate of their institutional rules, involve an extra success criterion.  In 
addition to being tested for their coping with environments, as organisms are, economic 
organizations are moreover tested for their coping with their own members. 
A comparison with an ant society may again illustrate.  For the evolutionary success of 
the ants’ genomes, this society only needs to be efficient enough to obtain all the needed 
resources from its environments, but they run no risk of being rejected by dissatisfied ants.  In 
contrast, the institutional rules of an organization, to succeed in their evolution, must 
moreover make themselves and the outcomes to which they lead sufficiently acceptable, 
possibly with the help of feasible enforcement, to its members.  
Because of this extra success criterion, the evolution of institutional rules can be 
retarded by repetitions of cycles of political and economic crises: institutional rules that lead 
to economic efficiency, and thus allow their organization successfully to cope with its 
environments, may be disliked and politically rejected by the members, while the politically 
preferred institutional rules may cause inefficiencies that throw the organization into a deep 
economic crisis, and be thus made unsustainable by the environments.  What appears to be the 
only way to prevent an unhappy end, in which some of the crises would grow into a 
catastrophe, is double learning: humans must learn which institutional rules can make their 
organizations efficient enough not to cause too deep economic crises, and then learn to like, or 
at least tolerate and respect, such rules, not to cause too deep political crises. 
 
II.4  Multilevel evolution and development in economics 
Much about several levels of economic evolution and development can be understood by 
interpreting Section I.6 in economic terms.  The small interactors can be interpreted as 
individuals, the large interactor as their national economy, and the mid-sized interactors as 
their smaller organizations – such as firms and government agencies.  The instructions 
involved are in the individuals’ genomes, in the internal institutional rules of their 
organizations, and in the overall institutional rules of the entire economy.  But there are three 
special points that should be noted. 
 First, to avoid confusion, it is important to keep in mind that the processes involved 
may switch names from evolution to development, and vice versa, depending on the level 
considered.  The already noted example is the evolution of the institutional rules of firms that 
is part of the development of the economy. 
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Second, compared to the “two levels of evolution with two levels of development” 
considered in Section I.6, there is now one more level of development.  Level zero, which has 
again no evolution, as human genomes are assumed constant, now involves the important 
development of human behaviors by extensive learning and adapting, for which these 
genomes provide rich initial instructing.  It was already noted that human learning and 
adapting may complicate the development of economic organizations by feedback loops 
already at one level.  It is rather obvious that many more such loops may complicate their 
development and evolution at several levels.  Here, however, it is only possible to note that 
the present conceptual framework can recognize them and make room for them, without 
examining them in detail. 
Third, the inter-level relationships that appear to require most attention in economic 
practice are those involving performance tests, success criteria, and selection.  The main 
principle is that the institutional rules of an organization whose performance is severely tested 
by environments must transmit, to remain selected and retained, much of this severity to the 
internal performance tests and selection criteria for its members.  Thus, for example, the 
institutional rules of an economy whose performance is tested in severe international 
competition must transmit much of this severity, together with its selection consequences, to 
the performance testing of its firms, and their internal institutional rules must transmit much 
of that severity, together with its selection consequences, to the performance testing of their 
employees, to begin with their managers.  In details, this principle may require qualifications 
due to well-known aspects of human psychology – such as the existence of limits to the 
pressure that can make individuals perform better rather than worse – but here also these 
details must be left aside. 
 
III  Examples of applications 
III.1 Group selection 
The issue of group selection is perhaps the clearest example of how the framework of SGD 
can help: this issue is still highly controversial and reputed for being difficult to understand, 
while the framework can explain it quite easily.  
First, the framework makes the simple but essential point that groups are interactors, 
and cannot therefore be units of selection.  It points out that groups are formed, developed and 
made function by their individual members who share and respect what are for each group its 
specific institutional rules, and that it is only these rules that can be selected and lastingly 
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retained in some evolutionary memory.  Group themselves may keep changing in many ways 
– their members may come and go, and they may even voluntarily dissolve.  They can 
therefore be only units of testing of their institutional rules: their performance is tested 
according to certain success criteria, and if they succeed, it is their rules that are selected and 
lastingly retained – e.g., written down or remembered by some of its former members.  They 
may then be used by similar individuals for the forming and developing of similar, similarly 
successful groups. 
A complication is that the institutional rules of a group can only be a limited part of all 
the instructions that govern individual behaviors.  To recall, the members must first of all 
possess some internal instructions that enable them to form groups in general, and according 
to the institutional rules of a specific group in particular. 
In consequence, there are several types of group selection, which differ in the 
proportion and the origins of the initial instructions, and in the variety of the institutional rules 
that these instructions allow the members to adopt.  To avoid confusion, at least three types of 
groups must be distinguished: (i) groups formed instinctively by animals without social 
learning – such as the earlier considered ant society; (ii) independent groups of humans – such 
as a tribe living in the wilderness; (iii) groups of humans within a larger society. 
In a type (i) group, all its institutional rules are part of their members’ genomes, which 
leave no room for any alternatives.  Whatever might be called “group selection” must 
therefore be an inseparable part of the biological evolution of these genomes. 
In a type (ii) group, all the initial instructions of its members are also part of their 
genomes.  But, being humans, the genomes enable them extensively to learn and adapt, so that 
the variety of institutional rules that they are able to adopt is consequently large (although not 
unlimited).  The responsibility for the performance of such a group is shared by its 
institutional rules and the genomes of its members, both of which thus also are, at their 
respective evolutionary levels, the targets of the selection. 
 In a type (iii) group, the initial instructions of its members, in addition to those 
contained in their genomes, moreover include the institutional rules of the larger society – 
such as its cultural (including religious) norms, and its legal framework.  These rules may 
crowd out much of the variety of institutional rules of groups that the members of the society 
can possibly adopt.  This shifts some of the responsibility for groups’ performance to the 
institutional rules of the society, which thus become a third target of the selection.  That these 
rules are indeed co-responsible can be seen by considering that the forming of groups is 
easier, and they have more chances to succeed, in some cultures and under some laws than in 
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other cultures and under other laws.   
 That human genomes are co-responsible for the performance of human groups and 
societies may not be immediately clear and calls therefore for explanation.  The point is that 
the genomes may indeed matter only little for how humans actually behave, but they are fully 
responsible for the variety of behaviors that their bearers, when instructed by different 
institutional rules, might possibly learn.  This responsibility becomes critical if the success of 
a group or a society requires individual behaviors that do not belong to this variety – such as 
behaviors that are more altruistic or more rational than what the genomes allow their bearers 
to learn. 
 
III.2  New questions that help bring together different fields of economics 
There are three relatively new fields of economics to which the framework of SGD is most 
closely related, although so far they have themselves kept rather separated from each other: 
cognitive economics, institutional economics,15 and evolutionary economics.  In addition to 
accommodating most of their actual questions and answers, the framework raises for them a 
few new questions that may help bring them together. 
 For cognitive economics, the main new questions are:  (1) What is reasonable to 
assume about the genomically given abilities of humans to learn and adopt different 
institutional rules, and thus adapt to different types of economies and societies?  (2) What is 
reasonable to assume about the bounds of human rationality and about the inequalities of their 
distribution in society? 
 Question (1) inquires into the limits of what may be called “universal social 
grammar,” a sister notion to the genomically given universal grammar that determines and 
limits the abilities of humans to learn languages, compellingly argued to exist by Chomsky 
(see, e.g., Chomsky 1976).  Its answer is important for questions about the evolution of 
institutional rules and about the possibilities of influencing this evolution by reform policies. 
 The answer to question (2) is important for two questions about the development of an 
economy: (a) To how high complexity may its top jobs be allowed to develop without 
overtaxing the cognitive abilities of its even most talented individuals?  (b) How sharp 
selection must be institutionalized to find for the top jobs the most talented individuals, or at 
least protect these jobs from incapable ones?  The point here is that the smaller the rationality 
                                                 
15 This term refers here to what is now often called “new institutional economics.” This differs from the 
traditional one, which mainly consists of critical essays where the term “institutions” is rarely well-defined, by 
defining this term with operational clarity and analyzing the effects of different institutional rules, formal and/or 
informal, on economies.  For present purposes the best introduction to it is North (1990). 
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inequalities, the less sharp selection is needed, and vice versa. 
 Institutional economics is directly concerned with the questions about the evolution of 
institutional rules and the possibilities of their reforms, which have been explored from its 
side by several authors (e.g., Hayek 1967, Vanberg 1992, North 2005).  The new question for 
this economics is:  What are the effects of different institutional rules on the self-organizing of 
individuals, through them on the formation, the development and evolution of production 
organizations, and ultimately on the development of an entire economy? 
This question demands institutional economics to extend attention from its usual focus 
on transaction costs and other incentives to the dynamics of industrial change.  Incentives 
undoubtedly remain important, but this dynamics strongly depends also on other, by 
institutional economists so far less explored factors – such as the freedom of entry and the 
tradability of ownership of firms, needed for allowing a rich variety of entrepreneurial trials, 
and the effectiveness of the selection by market competition, needed for enforcing precise and 
rapid elimination of the committed errors.  The basic idea for analysis is that the institutional 
rules which allow a rich variety of entrepreneurial trials while enforcing a rapid and precise 
elimination of errors are superior to those rules which limit the trials and let last the errors.16  
Institutional economics is moreover demanded to pay more attention to the differences 
between, and interrelations of, different levels or institutional rules – such as the corporate 
governance of specific firms and the corporate law of the entire economy.  Most institutional 
economists appear to deal with only one of these levels, without being very clear on how the 
two levels interrelate.  Clarity about their differences and interrelations is important for 
several issues of reform policies. 
Turning to evolutionary economics, the first implication of SGD is that not all the 
topics that economists who call themselves evolutionary study are really evolutionary.  In 
particular, in the changes of technologies, firms, and industries within capitalist market 
economies, which, following the classical works of Schumpeter (1934/12) and Nelson and 
Winter (1982), are perhaps the most studied topics, the only evolution may be the one of the 
firms’ institutional rules.  Otherwise all of that is industrial development, implicitly assumed 
to take place under constant institutional rules of market capitalism. 
The main new question here is complementary to the one raised for institutional 
economics:  How does industrial development depend on the prevailing institutional rules?  In 
what ways and at what speed this development would unfold under different variants of 
                                                 
16 This idea was used in Pelikan (1988, 1992) to expose the critical evolutionary weaknesses of all forms of 
socialism and selective industrial policies. 
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institutional rules?  The variants that now appear most important to examine are those of the 
rules for market economies with different degrees and forms of government regulation. 
This means that to be really evolutionary at the level of national economies, 
evolutionary economists would have to join the institutional ones who study the evolution of 
national and supranational institutional rules.  Note that this is a promising research strategy 
for both: the former could learn from the latter what they ignore about institutional rules, and 
the latter could learn from the former what they ignore about industrial development.  Such a 
cooperation of evolutionary and institutional economists also appears to be the only way to a 
clear understanding of this evolution.17 
 
III.3  Some elementary advice for policy analysis and development economics 
If all the above questions were given the right answers, these could help solve many problems 
of economic policy and economic development.   The two categories largely overlap, as the 
most urgent problems of development are just policy problems, especially those concerning 
institutional reforms.  But without waiting for the answers, the framework of SGD can 
provide some general advice already now. 
 This advice is mostly limited to the framing and structuring of these problems, and 
getting an effective handle on them.  It can be summarized in the following points: (1) 
indentify all the relevant institutional rules; (2) distinguish their evolution from the 
development of the organizations they instruct; (3) map the effects that different institutional 
rules may exert on the performance and the development of different organizations; (4) 
consider how different institutional rules may evolve. 
Three more points concern policy problems: (5) ask what government could do, and 
what it cannot do, to help, and not harm, the development of the economy and/or the 
evolution of its institutional rules; (5) keep in mind that the government itself, with its 
motivations and abilities, is the product of certain development under certain institutional 
rules; (6) when estimating the effects of any policy, do not forget to consider its secondary 
effects on all important developmental and evolutionary processes.  This last point is 
particularly important, as it was because of these effects that many policies which appeared 
successful in the short turned out to cause a deep crisis, while many of those which at first 
                                                 
17 Such a cooperation is described in Pelikan (2003b), although in different terms: what is here more logically 
called “development” is there called “Schumpeterian evolution.”  Attempts to realize such a cooperation within 
one person are in Pelikan (1988, 1992). 
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appeared hopeless later proved successful.18 
 The main general advice to development economics is to turn even more attention 
from the availability of resources to institutional rules.  These were for a long time entirely 
neglected, as if the growth of an animal depended only on how much it is fed.  Although in 
the beginning of the 1990’s, development economics started to admit that institutional rules 
matter, they were only put on a par with many other growth factors.  The framework of SGD 
makes clear their true importance by contrasting their effects on economic development with 
those of availability of resources: they determine a maximum development potential that a 
lack of resources may leave unfulfilled, but no surplus of resources can exceed – much like a 
lack of nutrition may prevent a mouse embryo from developing, but no nutrition, however 
abundant, can make it grow into an elephant.  The lesson is simple, although still rarely 
realized: when a poor economy under its actual institutional rules has obtained the possibly 
small quantities of resources for realizing the possibly low development potential of its actual 
institutional rules, any additional resources will be wasted, as the binding constraints on its 
further development are these rules. 
 Institutional rules that hinder the development of an economy raise two obvious 
questions: (A) Which institutional rules would do better?  (B) By what policies could the 
actual rules be reformed (transformed) into better ones? 
Question (A) leads to the above mentioned common task of institutional and 
evolutionary economists to discover the effects of alternative institutional rules on the 
development of economies.  While these effects are still far from fully known, discovering 
them appears perfectly feasible.19 
Question (B) is much more difficult.  Some institutional economists, including North 
(2005), have confessed that they are far from knowing the answer, and doubted that such 
reform policies might even exist.  The main problem is that deliberate policies can only 
change formal institutional rules, while the binding constraints on economic development 
often reside in the informal ones.  As these belong to the prevailing culture in the broadest 
sense of this word, including ethical and religious rules, the search for the answer leads to 
problems of multiculturalism, concerning the positive and negative effects of different 
                                                 
18 These three points are elaborated in Pelikan (2003a).  The first kinds of policies is there exemplified by the 
government driven at first successful economic development in Japan which ended in a deep structural crisis, 
and the second by the market reforms in Central and East European countries that began by making their bad 
situation even worse, but after a few years proved quite successful. 
19 In the framework of SGD, the search for these effects corresponds to the search of biologists for the effects of 
genes and genomes on the development and functioning of organisms, and the logic of institutional reforms 
corresponds to the logic of genomic engineering and genetic therapies.  An interesting formal model of the 
effects of genomes on the development of organisms in the context of genomic engineering is in Doursat (2008).  
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cultures on the economy and their different openness or resistance to learning and adapting. 
The framework of SGD may help here by pointing out that each culture consists of 
two significantly different parts: an economically relevant part, which influences the 
performance and development of economies, and an ornamental, economically neutral part, 
which may be highly valuable according to artistic, emotional, and other non-economic 
criteria.  The former can be exemplified by respect for property rights, sense of fairness, 
business ethics, tolerance for corruption, truth-telling, and trust; and the latter by traditional 
songs, dances, costumes, food, and religious rituals. 
Intuitively, the difference between the two parts can be compared to the difference 
between instructing and non-instructing memes, and to the one between instructing and non-
instructing parts of genomes (cf. Section II.3).  A culture may thus be visualized as a large 
and heterogeneous set of memes, which all replicate from mind to mind across a given 
economy, but of which only some are the informal institutional rules that instruct individual 
economic behaviors, and thus influence the economy’s performance and development.  The 
other memes appears suitable to call “ornamental.” 
 A difficulty is that the borderline between the two parts is not always entirely clear, 
and may even have to be shifted in the light of new discoveries.  In particular, some memes 
that may at first appear purely ornamental may turn out to have significant effect on economic 
outcomes, and thus be in fact part of informal institutional rules.  For instance, some food 
diets may turn out to have important economic effects because of their consequences for 
health and longevity, and different religious rituals may differently help or disrupt production.  
Where precisely to draw the borderline is therefore to some extent an open question that 
requires more research.20 
But independently of the precise position of this borderline, just recognizing its 
existence may save the debates on multiculturalism from confusion and settle many 
disagreements between its advocates and opponents.  When it is taken into account, a wide 
support appears easy to obtain, both for extensive multiculturalism concerning ornamental 
memes, and for its severe limitations concerning informal institutional rules. 
 All this has an important implication for immigration policies.  It modifies the usual 
assessment of the value for a rich country of immigration from a poor country.  In addition to 
                                                 
20 Continuing the intuitive comparison with the instructing and non-instructing parts of genomes, it may be 
interesting to note that the borderline between them is also partly unclear and the view of it has been moving.  
The first conjectures about it, when instructing was believed limited to genes, had to be corrected, as several 
non-genic DNA segments, first believed to be “junk” or "nonsense," were subsequently discovered to instruct 
important regulation of gene expression, and such discoveries are now expected to continue. 
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the usually considered positive value of the imported labor, it calls attention to the possibly 
negative value of the accompanying import of influences on the rich country’s institutional 
rules.  SGD joins here those institutional economists who try to enlighten the inhabitants of 
rich countries – of whom many still appear to be unaware of it – that  it is mainly thanks to 
their possibly only accidentally formed institutional rules that these countries have grown rich 
in the first place (see, e.g., North and Thomas 1973, Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986, North 
2005).  The difficult policy question than is, by what civilized means to protect these rules, if 
some immigrants from a poor country turn out to carry with them some of the informal 
institutional rules that are among the major causes of that country’s poverty – such as low 
respect for private property, rules of honor that foster wasteful conflicts rather than efficient 
competition, soft constraints on corruption and unethical business practices, and hard 
constraints on education opportunities for women, which both waste their talents and lower 
the quality of education of their children. 
 
Concluding comment 
All the above examples of are taken from problems that I have been seeking to understand 
myself, and with which the framework of SGD has actually helped me.  I just hope that this 
framework may also help other economists with other problems – which is my justification 
for presenting it in this paper.  As pointed out in the introduction, however, it cannot help all 
economists, but only some of those who are curious enough to look for inspiration also 
outside their own fields, and not with all of their problems, but only with those in which 
socioeconomic change plays a non-negligible role (although I cannot see many economic 
problems for which this would not be the case). 
 But even for the right economists with the right problems the possible help of this 
framework is limited.  It may only very generally advise on how to approach such problems 
and prepare them for well-ordered analysis, but without saying much about the analysis itself.  
Admittedly, such highly general advising is only little, but, as some of the greatest difficulties 
with problems of socioeconomic change are with approaching them and getting an effective 
handle on them, it may nevertheless be far from useless. 
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